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Abstract
We analyze the interplay between longevity, pollution and growth. We develop an
OLG model where longevity, pollution and growth are endogenous. The authorities may
provide two types of public services, public health and environmental maintenance, that
participate to increase agents’ life expectancy and to sustain growth in the long term.
We show that global dynamics might be featured by a high growth rate equilibrium,
associated with longer life expectancy and a environmental poverty trap. We examine
changes in public policies: increasing public intervention on health or environmental
maintenance display opposite effects on global dynamics, i.e. on the size of the trap and
on the level of the stable balanced growth path. On the contrary, each type of public
policy induces a negative leverage on the long run rate of growth.
JEL classification: I15; O44; Q56;
Keywords: Life expectancy; Pollution; Health; Growth.
1 Introduction
As it is commonly acknowledged in the literature, there exists a complementarity between
improvements in individuals’ health status, especially life expectancy, and economic devel-
opment. Healthier agents may be more productive at work, they are less absent and display
more cognitive capacities, thus stimulating growth. Indeed, the reasoning is quite intu-
itive: an augmented health status induces agents to accumulate more capital (be it physical
or human capital) since an increased longevity enhances the rate of return of investments
(education, savings among others). Individuals can enjoy and benefit longer from their in-
vestment in the future. Hence, by promoting accumulation of assets, longevity has crucial
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repercussions on development in the long term. In turn, governments of richer countries
are able to levy more resources to finance health structures, provide health services and
improve access to the latter, while the economy develops. In the end, these two key ingredi-
ents feed on each other to promote growth. Theoretical papers like Blackburn and Cipriani
(2002), Chakraborty (2004) or Cervelatti and Sunde (2005) also provide an illustration to
such arguments.1
Unfortunately, economic growth might also be a source of negative externalities by de-
teriorating the environment. This damaging effect is not without consequences on health
status, but it even may be a major cause of reduced longevity. Typically, the World Health
Organization2 points out that outdoor pollution might be responsible worldwide for 9% of
lung cancer deaths or 5% of cardiopulmonary deaths while 88 % of diarrhoal deaths are
attributable to unsafe water. Broadly speaking, climate change causes 150 000 excess deaths
annually while indoor pollution kills 2 millions people in 2012. This phenomena has of-
ten been addressed by economists and is also a major concern for many physicians (see
among others Pope (2000), Chay and Greenstone (2003), Dasgupta (2004), Evans and Smith
(2005), WHO (2004, 2006)). Most empirical studies usually conclude to a significant and
detrimental impact of air (or/and water) pollution on health status, in particular those of
children and elderly people. For instance, Chay and Greenstone (2003) show that a reduc-
tion in 1mg/m 3 in particulates results in 4-8 fewer infant deaths per 100 000 live births.
Even though the magnitude of these effects is still discussed, they argue that chronic as well
as acute episodes of pollution can translate into pulmonary and cardio-vulnerability, neu-
ropsychiatric disorders, more hospital admissions, diseases and even deaths attributable to
environmental hazards.
Hence, regarding these two types of argument and evidence, changes in longevity should
be considered with respect to both the evolution of environmental quality and the develop-
ment of health policies. Thus, the authorities might intervene and undertake appropriate
actions to reduce health impacts induced by a damaged environmental quality in order to
promote growth and development. These actions could be of two distinct types: (i) a public
health policy to weaken harmful effects of pollution on health status or/and (ii) a public
environmental policy in order to reduce environmental damages.
The aim of this paper is precisely to study the dynamic path of pollution and economic
growth when households’ longevity is endogenously determined by both health policy and
environmental quality. We are especially concerned with the effects of a public intervention,
taking the form of health spendings as well as environmental expenses.
In our overlapping generations model, households live at most two periods, since the
length of second period life is uncertain. As supported by the empirical literature, longevity
is driven by two main factors: public health spending and environmental quality. Health
services and environmental maintenance are financed thanks to taxes on labor income and
provided by authorities. A priori, the two types of public expenditures seem to play a simi-
lar role by improving life expectancy. However, they differ in many ways so that the design
of the public policy is a key issue of our analysis. Indeed, the flow of health expenditures
could be interpreted as "curative" actions undertaken by the authorities to treat ill-health in-
dividuals and directly improve life expectancy. Differently, the environmental expenditures
1. See Mirowsky and Ross (1998) for a detailed survey on the relationship between human capital and longevity.
2. One can also refer for instance to the reports by the World Health organization on the indicator of environ-
mental health.
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could be regarded as "preventive" actions engaged in order to diminish the future harmful
stock of pollution, which captures the level of environmental quality within the economy.
This stock grows through pollution flows that are a direct by-product of production mean-
while it is reduced thanks to cleaning activities provided by the authorities.
As a consequence of microeconomic behaviors, physical capital and pollution evolve
jointly. Because we introduce an AK-type technology, both grow endogenously. Study-
ing global dynamics and focusing on the design of the public intervention, we show that
multiple steady states, associated with balanced growth paths, and the emergence of an en-
vironmental poverty trap are driven by the endogenous longevity but also the existence of
pollution as a stock.
Furthermore, we argue that the two instruments exhibit different outcomes on global
dynamics. When multiple equilibria exist, an augmentation of preventive environmental
actions induces ambiguous effects. On the one hand, it enlarges the environmental poverty
trap but, on the other hand, it rises the ratio of capital over pollution of the stable steady
state, characterized by a larger growth rate. Therefore, a higher green fiscal pressure, for a
given level of public health expenditures, is beneficial only to economies who have already
reached a critical level of development. Otherwise, it could lead one economy into a vicious
cycle and drives it to the environmental poverty trap. In contrast, when we examine the
effects of a change in the level of curative actions, the results are opposite. Hence, a rise
in the health tax rate is detrimental for the economies which have already reached a high
enough level of economic development. Nonetheless, it can help one economy initially
stuck into the environmental poverty trap to step out and reach a steady state with a larger
growth rate in the long term. In any case, this analysis of global dynamics implies that the
two types of public spending display different outcomes and are not substitutable.
However, this conclusion is no more relevant when we focus on the effects of health and
environmental policies on the growth rates at a steady state. Indeed, an augmented level of
either the environmental or health expenditures has a negative impact on economic growth.
We may note that in this paper, we focus on the effects of policy instruments on global
dynamics, i.e. the size of the environmental poverty trap and the level of development in the
long-run, and on the growth rate. However, in line with Bovenberg and Smulders (1996)
or Ono (2003), we ignore welfare issues. Indeed, some policies, especially environmental
ones, face informational and political constraints, and have difficulties to fully internalize
externalities that prevent the government to correctly implement the optimal policy.
The paper is based on the well-known one by Chakraborty (2004). Indeed, we extend his
framework to take into account pollution as an additional determinant of longevity. Jouvet
et al. (2010) is also linked to our paper, but in contrast to us, dynamics are not examined.
Moreover, our paper is close to Varvarigos (2009) and Palivos and Varvarigos (2012), as they
consider that longevity is positively affected by public spending and negatively by pollu-
tion. But, different from them, we consider dynamics of the environmental variable since
pollution is no longer a flow but a stock that depends on past pollution flows, production
and public cleaning activities. Finally, in contrast to Balestra and Dottori (2012), we ignore
the implications of aging on voting decision, but have growth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model.
In Section 3, we define the inter-temporal equilibrium. Steady states characterized by bal-
anced growth paths are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of dy-
namics. The effects of policies on the level of growth are derived in Section 6, while some
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concluding remarks appear in Section 7. Proofs and technical details are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 The model
In this section, we present our basic framework and derive the optimal microeconomic
choices of agents.
2.1 Production
In this economy, one unique final good is produced by a continuum of competitive firms
using the following technology: Yt = F(Kt, KtLt), where Yt is aggregate production, Kt
aggregate capital, Lt aggregate labor. The production function F(Kt, KtLt) has usual prop-
erties and is homogeneous of degree 1. The variable Kt accounts for the aggregate (average)
capital, which is taken as given by private firms. Hence, the production benefits from exter-
nalities (which are labour-augmenting) that will be the engine of endogenous growth.
Let us note wt the real wage and rt the real interest rate. Profits maximization by firms
yields:
wt = F2(Kt/Kt, Lt)Kt (1)
rt = F1(Kt/Kt, Lt) (2)
where Fi denotes the partial derivatives of function F with respect to its ith argument.
2.2 Households
In this overlapping generations model, agents live for two periods. There is no population
growth so that the population size of a young generation is normalized to one. Time is
discrete and indexed by t = 0, ...,+∞. When young, an household lives during the entire
period. He consumes the final good (ct) and saves (st). When old, agents’ time length 3 is
given by φt 6 1, namely the longevity. They also consume dt+1 at each moment of time.
The remunerated saving is used to finance this old consumption. The preferences of an
household born at date t are represented by the following utility function:
Ut = ln ct + φt ln dt+1, (3)
where φt captures agents’ longevity. In this paper, we emphasize the important role played
by both health care expenses (Ht) and the reduction of the pollution stock (Pt) to improve
agents’ health status and, in particular, longevity. Indeed, we consider the net effect of
pollution on health, taking into account the government expenditures as a mean to protect
against pollution-induced damages. Formally, the critical determinant of life expectancy
becomes the ratio Ht/Pt. This setup, crucial to our analysis, can be supported by a large
body of both economic and medical empirical studies. Mainly microeconomic, those studies
point out that air pollution is likely to have a greater impact on agents with lower access
3. The variable φt can also be interpreted as a survival probability.
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to primarily medical care (see Bates (1995)). Typically, in their study lead in New York City
(US), Gwynn and Thurston (2001) assess the contribution of socioeconomic status (hereafter
SES) to any observed racial differences in pollution effects. They show that discrepancies in
air pollution effects among agents stem from health care disparities, in particular for Ozone
(O3) pollution. They calculate a relative risk for respiratory hospital admission and show
that the latter belongs to the interval 1.032 to 1.12 according to the racial category. Similarly,
Niedell (2004) in his study on Californian (US) data emphasize larger pollution exposure
for low SES children. The author shows that a decrease in pollution level from 1992 to 1998
reduced asthma rates from 5-14 % meanwhile children with low SES suffer greater harm
from air pollution.
To be more specific, we assume that φt ≡ φ(Ht/Pt), where φ′(.) > 0 > φ′′(.) and
0 6 φ(0) = δ/e 6 φ(+∞) = b 6 1. Let us consider the following function that satisfies
these properties:
φ(Ht/Pt) =
δ+ bHt/Pt
e+ Ht/Pt
(4)
with δ > 0 and e > 0. Let us underline that when δ = e = 0, the longevity becomes
constant, i.e. φt = b. Taking now e > 0, longevity is still positive despite the absence of
health expenditures (Ht = 0) if δ > 0. Moreover, when δ increases from 0 to eb, longevity
becomes less dependent on Ht/Pt and less concave, for a given level of the ratio Ht/Pt.
For tractability reasons, this functional form will be used all along the paper to derive main
analytical results.4
The household maximizes the utility function (3) considering φt, wt, Rt+1, the fiscal pol-
icy as given and facing the two following budget constraints:
ct + st = (1− τ1 − τ2)wt (5)
φtdt+1 = Rt+1st, (6)
with τ1 the tax rate that finances public health expenditures and τ2 the one which allows
for environmental maintenance5 and Rt+1 is the gross return on investment. Note that
following Chakraborty (2004) or Varvarigos (2009) among the others, we assume a perfect
annuity market. The return of total savings realized by the young is equally distributed
among survival old households. Using (5) and (6), we can also define the life-cycle budget
constraint:
ct +
φt
Rt+1
dt+1 = (1− τ1 − τ2)wt (7)
Maximizing utility function (3) under the inter-temporal budget constraint (7) yields the
4. Note that Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and Castelló-Climent and Doménech (2008) use closely related ex-
pressions for the longevity in their paper.
5. We could, of course, have considered that only one tax is levied on labour income and the product of this
taxation shared among curative and preventive expenditures. For the clarity of the paper and the comparative
statics exercise presented in the following section, we argue that such our set-up is more adapted. Let us notice
that he two modeling choices are otherwise equivalent.
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optimal microeconomic choices of an household:
ct =
(1− τ1 − τ2)wt
1+ φt
(8)
dt+1 =
Rt+1(1− τ1 − τ2)wt
1+ φt
(9)
Using (6) and (9), we easily deduce individuals’ savings:
st =
φt(1− τ1 − τ2)wt
1+ φt
(10)
Both consumption and savings are negatively affected by the fiscal policy through an
income effect. Longevity tends to lower consumption during youth but stimulates savings,
as in Chakraborty (2004).
2.3 Public sector
In our setup, the public sector provides health services Ht, which directly increase longevity,
and public environmental spendings Gt, which help improving environmental quality (and
so indirectly increase life expectancy). The curative health expenditures embody, among
others, the infrastructures of the medical system, the access to health care, the medical tech-
nological level. The preventive actions gather all abatement activities engaged by public
authorities that affect the stock of pollution. Both are financed by labor income taxation so
that:
Ht = τ1wtLt (11)
Gt = τ2wtLt, (12)
with τ1 + τ2 < 1. Equations (11) and (12) mean that government acts as if there are two sepa-
rate balanced-budget constraints. In contrast to Varvarigos (2009) or Palivos and Varvarigos
(2012), this will allow us to treat the two types of expenditures as independent.
2.4 Environmental quality
Finally, in this set-up, we introduce a variable that accounts for the deterioration of the
environment: the stock of pollution. We assume that the future pollution stock depends on
past pollution Pt > 0, like air or water pollution for instance. We also consider that it grows
with production meanwhile it diminishes thanks to public cleaning activities. Thus, the law
of motion of pollution can be written as:
Pt+1 = (1−m)Pt + a1Yt − a2Gt (13)
with m ∈ (0, 1] the natural absorption of pollution, a1 > 0, a2 > 0, and P0 > 0 given.
The stock of physical capital displays two opposite effects on the accumulation of pollution.
On the one hand, production has a side-effect and generates pollution with an exogenous
technology, a1; On the other hand, production induces public receipts that finance cleaning
activities with a given technology, a2.
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3 Equilibrium
Being given that the population size of a young working generation equals one, the equilib-
rium in the labor market is ensured by Lt = 1. At the equilibrium, we also have Kt = Kt. Let
us define A ≡ F(1, 1) and α ≡ F1(1, 1)/F(1, 1), which implies that 1− α = F2(1, 1)/F(1, 1).
Then, as in a standard AK model, equations (1) and (2) rewrite:
wt = (1− α)AKt (14)
rt = αA (15)
and production is given by Yt = AKt.
According to the law of motion of pollution and using equations (12) and (14), equation
(13) rewrites:
Pt+1 = (1−m)Pt + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))AKt (16)
In the following, we realistically assume that pollution flows are strictly positive:
Assumption 1. a1 > a2τ2(1− α)
Note that this parametric assumption enforces an additional upper bound only on the
environmental tax rate τ2, and consequently on the level of preventive expenses. Such an
assumption finds a support in the paper by Economides and Philippopoulos (2008), for
instance.
In addition, equilibrium on the capital market is satisfied when Kt+1 = st, that is savings
are used to finance the capital stock. Using (10), this is equivalent to:
Kt+1 =
φt
1+ φt
(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)AKt (17)
Finally, longevity can be defined as a function of the ratio capital over pollution, xt ≡
Kt/Pt, at the equilibrium.6 Indeed, using (14), we can express the survival probability as
follows:
φt = φ (τ1(1− α)Axt) (18)
Substituting (18) in (17), the dynamics of the economy are, a priori, characterized by a
two-dimensional system (16)-(17), K0 > 0 and P0 > 0 being given. This system describes
the evolution of both pollution and capital over time. Since there exists an externality of
physical capital, growth is endogenous and the variables Kt and Pt do not reach a stationary
value in the long term. However, defining the capital growth factor gkt ≡ Kt+1/Kt, equation
(17) can be rewritten:
gkt =
φ (τ1(1− α)Axt)
1+ φ (τ1(1− α)Axt) (1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)A (19)
Using (16) and (18), we get:
xt+1 =
φ (τ1(1− α)Axt)
1+ φ (τ1(1− α)Axt)
(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)Axt
1−m + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))Axt (20)
6. Note that this ratio is proportional to the inverse of the pollution intensity of production.
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We can observe that, given the path of the predetermined variable xt, we determine the
growth factor gkt. Hence, analyzing the potential steady states and the dynamics of xt, we
deduce the balanced growth paths and their stability properties. More specifically, substi-
tuting (4) into (20), dynamics are driven by:
xt+1 =
δ+ bτ1(1− α)Axt
(e+ δ) + (1+ b)τ1(1− α)Axt
(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)Axt
1−m + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))Axt ≡ ψ(xt) (21)
4 Steady state analysis
A steady state is a solution x > 0 such that xt+1 = xt = x = ψ(x). At a steady state, the
rate of growth of physical capital is identical to the one of pollution stock. According to
equation (21), it should satisfy:
x =
δ+ bτ1(1− α)Ax
(e+ δ) + (1+ b)τ1(1− α)Ax
(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)Ax
1−m + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))Ax (22)
A quick look at equation (22) allows us to claim that one steady state is obviously x = 0.
However, besides this trivial stationary value, other solutions x > 0 might exist. These
results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Let
A0(δ) ≡ (e+ δ)(1−m)
δ(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α) (23)
A1(δ) ≡ (1−m)(1+ b)τ1(1− α) + (e+ δ)(a1 − a2τ2(1− α))bτ1(1− α)2(1− τ1 − τ2) (24)
Under Assumption 1, eb > δ > 0, e > 0 and m < 1, the following generically holds:
1. If A > A0(δ), there is a unique steady state x0 > 0;
2. If A < A0(δ), there exists a threshold value δ ∈ (0, eb) such that A0(δ) > A1(δ) for all
δ < δ. Then, for all δ < δ and A ∈ (A1(δ), A0(δ)), with A sufficiently close to A0(δ), there
exist two steady states x1(> 0) and x2(> x1).
Note that in the limit case where m = 1, there is a unique steady state x0 > 0, but the steady state
x = 0 is ruled out. When δ = e = 0, the steady state x = 0 still remains and there is a unique
steady state x0 > 0 if and only if A >
(1−m)(1+b)
(1−τ1−τ2)(1−α)b .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Importantly, we should emphasize that the emergence of multiple equilibria is condi-
tional to the existence of both an endogenous longevity (eb > δ > 0) and inertia in the
evolution of the pollution stock (m < 1). To that extent, we differ from the papers by
Chakraborty (2004), Blackburn and Cipriani (2002), Varvarigos (2009) or Palivos and Var-
varigos (2012). Indeed, from equation (20), we can see that the law of motion of xt (the stock
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of capital over pollution) is defined by the combination of two ratios. The first one corre-
sponds to the saving rate φt/(1 + φt) and the second one to the ratio of net labor income
over pollution. The first one is constant when δ = e = 0, whereas the second one is constant
when m = 1. As it is clear from the above analysis, the multiplicity of steady states x1 and
x2 occurs if both these two effects play a role, that is longevity has to be endogenous and
pollution to be less than proportional to income. Finally, note that, for e > 0, this multi-
plicity is not ruled out when δ > 0, i.e. health services are not essential to have a nonzero
longevity. However, δ has not to be too large, meaning that longevity should be sufficiently
concave.
Using (19), we argue that to each stationary value x corresponds a growth factor gk,
given by:
gk =
φ (τ1(1− α)Ax)
1+ φ (τ1(1− α)Ax) (1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)A = 1−m + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))Ax (25)
where the last equality is obtained using (22). By direct inspection of (25), we deduce that gk
is increasing in x, meaning that a steady state characterized by a larger level of capital per
pollution is associated with a higher growth rate of capital. In particular, the growth rates
can be ranked: gk|x=x2 > gk|x=x1 .
5 Dynamics
Let us now focus on the dynamic behavior of our economy, as we can obtain a full charac-
terization of global dynamics.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, eb > δ > 0, e > 0 and m < 1, the following generically
holds:
1. For A > A0(δ), the unique steady state x0 > 0 is stable, while x = 0 is unstable;
2. For all δ < δ and A ∈ (A1(δ), A0(δ)), with A sufficiently close to A0(δ), the steady state x1
is unstable, x2(> x1) is stable, while x = 0 is stable.
Note that in the limit case where m = 1, the steady state x0 > 0 is globally stable. When
δ = e = 0, the steady state x0 > 0 is stable, while x = 0 is unstable.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As it is illustrated in Figure 1a, this proposition shows that if A > A0(δ), the economy
monotonically converges to x0 > 0, no matter initial conditions. Conversely, as described
in Figure 1b, if the level of productivity in the economy is not so high, then multiplicity of
equilibria occurs. In that case, initial conditions determine the long run situation reached
by the economy. Let us consider one economy initially located on the left-hand side of x1.
Then, xt is relegated to the environmental poverty trap. During the convergence phase,
capital over pollution decreases and one is driven to a steady state with a zero stock of
physical capital. The mechanisms at stake are quite intuitive: if initially, the stock of capital
over pollution is low, so does longevity. Young agents are not likely to save but favor cur-
rent consumption. Despite preventive expenditures, pollution increases more than physical
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xt
xt+1
0 x
ψ(xt)
(a) A > A0(δ)
xt
xt+1
0 x1 x2
ψ(xt)
(b) δ < δ and A ∈ (A1(δ), A0(δ))
Figure 1. Global Dynamics
capital. Consequently, it induces a reduction of life expectancy and leads the economy into
a vicious cycle. In contrast, if the economy is initially located on the right-hand side of x1, it
converges monotonically to the high stable steady state, x2. In that configuration, the ratio
of capital over pollution always increases to reach its stationary value, meaning that the
stock of capital rises more than pollution. At the steady state, physical capital and pollution
grow at the same rate, and longevity is higher. In other words, if the initial stock of capital
is sufficiently large regarding the initial stock of pollution, life expectancy is long enough to
foster savings, since curative health services are sufficiently large with respect to pollution.
5.1 The effects of preventive environmental expenditures on dynamics
Let us now investigate more deeply the effect of abatement activities on the dynamics. We
focus on the most interesting case where there is an environmental poverty trap (Proposition
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2.2). The results concerning case 1 of Proposition 2 can be easily deduced from the analysis
below.
To evaluate all the potential effects at stake on the dynamics, we start by analyzing how
ψ(xt), as defined in equation (21), evolves according to an increase in τ2. Using
∂ψ(x)
∂τ2
= (1− α)Ax δ+ bτ1(1− α)Ax
e+ δ+ (1+ b)τ1(1− α)Ax
Ax(a2(1− α)(1− τ1)− a1)− (1−m)
[1−m + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))Ax]2
We can deduce the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let
xa =
1−m
A[a2(1− τ1)(1− α)− a1] (26)
Under Assumption 1, eb > δ > 0, e > 0 and m < 1, the following generically holds for all δ < δ
and A ∈ (A1(δ), A0(δ)), with A sufficiently close to A0(δ).
1. If a1 > a2(1− τ1)(1− α), ∂ψ(xt)/∂τ2 < 0 for all xt > 0. See Figure 2a.
2. If a1 < a2(1− τ1)(1− α), ∂ψ(xt)/∂τ2 < 0 for all xt < xa and ∂ψ(xt)/∂τ2 > 0 for all
xt > xa. See Figure 2b drawn for x1 < xa < x2 and Figure 2c for x1 > xa.
From equation (21), we can easily observe the twofold effects of an increase in preventive
actions on the ratio capital-pollution, xt. On the one hand, there exists a negative income
effect: Larger environmental expenditures reduce the remaining income to save and thus
physical capital accumulation slows down. On the other hand, it displays a positive effect
by reducing pollution flow. Since we have identified these two main mechanisms, we can
state:
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, eb > δ > 0, e > 0 and m < 1, the following generically
holds for all δ < δ and A ∈ (A1(δ), A0(δ)), with A sufficiently close to A0(δ).
1. If a1 > a2(1− τ1)(1− α), an increase of τ2 reduces the level of capital over pollution at the
stable steady state, but enlarges the environmental poverty trap.
2. If a1 < a2(1− τ1)(1− α), and if
a xa > x2, the effect of τ2 is similar to the previous case;
b x1 < xa < x2, an increase of τ2 increases the level of capital over pollution at the stable
steady state, but also enlarges the environmental poverty trap;
c xa < x1, a rise of τ2 increases the level of capital over pollution at the stable steady state,
but reduces the environmental poverty trap.
In configuration 1, the income effect always dominates, which explains that, following
a rise in the level of preventive actions, one economy is more likely to fall into the trap.
In addition, it could be the case that an economy, close on the right-hand side of x1, that
would have monotonically converge to the high steady state is now driven into the trap.
Indeed, since a1 is relatively high, the production technology is highly polluting and the
maintenance technology is relatively less efficient. In that case, augmenting the amount of
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xt
xt+1
0 x1 x2
ψ(xt)
(a) when a1 > a2(1− τ1)(1− α)
xt
xt+1
0 x1 x2xa
ψ(xt)
(b) when a1 < a2(1 − τ1)(1 − α) and x1 <
xa < x2
xt
xt+1
0 x1 x2xa
ψ(xt)
(c) when a1 < a2(1− τ1)(1− α) and xa < x1
Figure 2. An increase in preventive actions
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resources devoted to environmental maintenance first impedes the accumulation of physi-
cal capital but, in addition, is not sufficient to offset the harmful effect of production on the
environment. Consequently, it can clearly slow down the economic development.
Conversely, in configuration 2, investing in preventive actions might be more appro-
priate. In particular, a more ambitious environmental public policy may exhibit a global
positive effect: If the threshold value xa is sufficiently low, the economy reaches a higher
steady state value and the development-environment trap is reduced (see configuration
2.c). Otherwise said, the reduced-pollution effect always dominates the income effect. For
instance, one economy initially located close on the left of x1, that would have been stuck
into the trap, might be driven to the high equilibrium. This configuration is interesting with
respect to the famous Environmental Kuznets Curve, pointed up by Grossman and Krueger
(1995). The EKC pattern of development could be summarized as follows: For low stages
of development, the economy develops while polluting and deteriorating the environment.
Once a sufficiently high level of development/income is reached, the relationship inverts :
The economy still develops but reduces pollution and thus improves environmental quality.
Typically, one economy initially located close on the left-hand side of x1 could experience
such a non-monotonic pattern of development. First, since longevity is low, the economy
collapses, but, following an increase in the public abatement activities, the ratio capital over
pollution stops reducing but starts increasing to reach the high stationary equilibrium.
When xa belongs to the interval [x1, x2], the results are more ambiguous. Even if the
level of xa depends in a quite complicated manner on the parameter values, one can show
that for A sufficiently large , we have θ(xa) < 0, that is x1 < xa < x2. As claimed in the
corollary below, this means that this configuration is probably the most relevant one when
a1 < a2(1− τ1)(1− α).
Corollary 1. Let
Aτ2 ≡
(1−m)a2[(1−m)(1+ b)τ1(1− α) + (e+ δ)(a2(1− τ1)(1− α)− a1)]
[a2(1− τ1)(1− α)− a1][(1− α)b(1−m)τ1 + δ(a2(1− τ1)(1− α)− a1)] (27)
Under Assumption 1, eb > δ > 0, e > 0, m < 1 and a1 < a2(1 − τ1)(1 − α), there exists
δ˜ > 0 such that Aτ2 < A0(δ) for all δ ∈ (0, δ˜). Then, for all δ ∈ (0, min
{
δ˜, δ
}
) and A ∈
(max {Aτ2 , A1(δ)} , A0(δ)), with A sufficiently close to A0(δ), we have x1 < xa < x2, i.e. case
2.b of Proposition 3 applies.
Proof. See Appendix C.
On one side, augmented preventive actions lead the economy to reach a higher steady
state value. But on the other side, the environmental poverty trap enlarges, so that one
economy is more likely to converge to the low stable equilibrium x = 0. For instance, an
economy, that would have converged towards the high stationary value x2, might be driven
into the trap.
5.2 The effects of curative health expenditures on dynamics
Let us now isolate the role played by a more generous health policy, the level of expendi-
tures devoted to abatement activities being constant. As above, we focus on the most inter-
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esting case 1.2 of (Proposition 2) and we note that results concerning case 1 of Proposition 2
can be easily deduced from the analysis below.
From (21), we can easily observe that an increase in the level of curative actions engaged
by the authorities displays at least also two opposite effects on xt: (i) First, through a usual
income effect, it reduces the revenue to be saved and thus has a negative effect on x; But
(ii), second, it participates to augment longevity, thus fostering savings. The global effect
depends on which effect dominates. We have:
∂ψ(x)
∂τ1
=
(1− α)Ax
[e+ δ+ (1+ b)τ1(1− α)Ax]2[1−m + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))Ax]H(x) (28)
with
H(x) ≡ −(e+ δ)δ+ A(1− α)[be(1− τ2− 2τ1)− δ(1− τ2 + 2bτ1)]x− b(1+ b)τ21 (1− α)2 A2x2
(29)
In the following lemma, we explain how ψ(x) evolves according to a rise in curative
health expenditures:
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1, eb > δ, e > 0 and m < 1, the following generically holds for all
δ < δ and A ∈ (A1(δ), A0(δ)), with A sufficiently close to A0(δ). There exists δH ∈ (0, eb) such
that:7
1. If δ > δH , ∂ψ(xt)/∂τ1 < 0 for all xt > 0.
2. If 0 6 δ < δH , there exist xH1 > 0 and xH2 (> xH1 ) such that ∂ψ(xt)/∂τ1 < 0 for all xt < xH1 ,
∂ψ(xt)/∂τ1 > 0 for all xH1 < xt < x
H
2 and ∂ψ(xt)/∂τ1 < 0 for all xt > x
H
2 . Note that in
the limit case where δ = 0, we have xH1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Using Lemma 2, we can then prove the following (see Figure 3):
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1, eb > δ = 0, e > 0 and m < 1, the following generically
holds for all δ < δ and A ∈ (A1(δ), A0(δ)), with A sufficiently close to A0(δ).
1. If δ > δH or A is sufficiently large and δ sufficiently low (in accordance with A < A0(δ)), an
increase of τ1 reduces the level of capital over pollution at the stable steady state.
2. If A is sufficiently large and δ sufficiently low (in accordance with A < A0(δ)), an increase
of τ1 reduces the level of the environmental poverty trap.
Proof. See Appendix E.
This proposition shows that a policy promoting curative health care may have ambigu-
ous effects. One economy initially located close on the left-hand side of x1 that would have
converged into the environmental poverty trap may escape from it by investing in cura-
tive health expenditures and finally reach the high stationary equilibrium. The augmented
length of second period life time thanks to additional health expenditures allows to boost
7. The expressions of xH1 and x
H
2 are given in Appendix D.
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xt+1
0 x1 x2
ψ(xt)
Figure 3. A rise in curative health expenditures
savings. Again, we are able to reproduce a non-monotonic development pattern like EKC.
Nonetheless, if the economy is initially located on the right-hand side of x1, the larger re-
ceipts devoted to health do not modify the development trajectory except that the equi-
librium reached is lower. This negative impact is due to the properties of the longevity
function. Indeed, life expectancy is increasing and concave with the ratio of capital over
pollution. Then, as soon as xt increases, so does longevity, but less and less. Otherwise said,
if the contribution to curative actions increases, but longevity is already high, the benefits
on longevity are relatively low compared to the negative income effect. This also explains
why a sufficiently low δ is required to have a reduced environmental poverty trap. Indeed,
as seen above, the longevity is sufficiently concave and strongly depends on health services
in this case. Therefore, the effect on longevity dominates the decrease of net income, taking
into account of course that the ratio of capital-pollution is not too large.
Let us now concentrate on the policy recommendation we could draw from this above
analysis, following Proposition 3, Corollary 1 and Proposition 4. We can show that the
efficiency of each type of public expenditures crucially depends on the considered stage of
development. Typically, in order to step out from the trap and for initial poor economies,
it seems more appropriate to invest first in curative actions, that is to cure people that may
suffer from bad hygienic conditions and deteriorated environment, the level of abatement
activities being given. In a second step only, once the income reached by one economy and
the longevity are high enough, it becomes more attractive to invest in preventive actions to
sustain a higher level of capital compared to pollution.
6 Growth, environmental and health policies
In the previous section, we have underlined the different effects of each policy on dynamics.
In this section, we are interested in their effects on the long-run rate of growth (gk). Focusing
on a stable steady state, the results are summarized in the following proposition:
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Proposition 5. Under the assumptions of Propositions 3 and 4, the following holds at a Balanced
Growth Path:
1. an increase of τ1 implies a decrease of gk;
2. an increase of τ2 implies a decrease of gk if δ is sufficiently low and A sufficiently close to
A0(δ), in any case larger than
a2(e+δ)
(1−α)bτ1 .
Proof. See Appendix F.
This result can be understood as follows. At a steady state which characterizes a bal-
anced growth path, capital and pollution grow at the same rate.
Examining equation (25), we immediately see that the effect of curative health expen-
ditures on growth only goes through the ratio of capital over pollution x. Yet, as seen in
Proposition 4, x is decreasing in τ1 at a stable steady state. This lowers pollution flow,
and therefore the pollution growth. This induces a lower capital growth rate at a balanced
growth path.
Focusing now on preventive environmental activities, we argue that the effect of τ2 goes
through two channels on pollution flow. There is a direct one which always reduces pol-
lution, (and so the growth rate) because it increases government expenditures devoted to
improve environmental quality. An indirect one goes through the ratio capital over pollu-
tion, as before. When x is decreasing in τ2, we can infer that the growth rates of pollution,
and therefore of capital reduce. This occurs in cases 1 and 2.a of Proposition 3. In contrast,
in cases 2.b and 2.c of Proposition 3, the direct and indirect effects go in opposite directions.
As shown in Proposition 5, the direct effect dominates. A larger environmental tax rate in-
duces a higher level of public spending, reducing the pollution growth rate as well as the
capital one.
In the previous section, we have seen that environmental and health policies have op-
posite effects on the dynamics, enlarging or not the environment-development trap and in-
creasing or not the level of capital over pollution at the stable steady state. On the contrary,
focusing on the growth rates, we rather have to conclude that both health and environmen-
tal public expenditures exhibit similar effects. Even if surely our model is not sufficiently
complicated to give some clear-cut policy recommendations, it asks the question on whether
improving growth should be or not a relevant objective for the government.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the relationship between longevity, pollution and growth. We have pre-
sented an OLG model where growth, pollution and longevity are endogenous. Govern-
ment intervention is twofold, providing health services and environmental maintenance.
The analysis of global dynamics allows us to exhibit the coexistence of a stable balanced
growth path with an environmental poverty trap. We stress out that the two public policies
have opposite effects on dynamics, i.e. the size of the trap and the level of the stable steady
state with a high level of growth, despite the fact that both raise longevity. On the contrary,
increasing the contribution of either health services or environmental maintenance is detri-
mental for economic growth. Hence, focusing on positive issues of policy, recommendations
are quite contrasted depending on the objective of the government.
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8 Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
A steady state with x > 0 is a solution of the following equation:
θ(x) ≡ (1+ b)τ1(1− α)A2(a1 − a2τ2(1− α))x2 + [(1−m)(1+ b)τ1(1− α)A
+(a1 − a2τ2(1− α))A(e+ δ)− (1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)2 A2bτ1]x
+(1−m)(e+ δ)− δ(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)A = 0 (A.1)
Under Assumption 1, we have θ′′(x) > 0 and θ(+∞) = +∞. Two main cases emerge.
If A > A0(δ), we get θ(0) < 0, which ensures that there exists a unique steady state,
namely x0 > 0.
If A < A0(δ), we have θ(0) > 0. In this case, there is generically either no steady state,
or two steady states. Let x˜ such that θ′(x˜) = 0. The existence of two steady states x1(> 0)
and x2(> x1) is ensured by x˜ > 0 and θ(x˜) < 0.
Using (A.1), we get:
x˜ =
(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)2 Abτ1 − (1−m)(1+ b)τ1(1− α)− (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))(e+ δ)
2(1+ b)τ1(1− α)A(a1 − a2τ2(1− α))
(A.2)
Since the denominator is strictly positive, x˜ > 0 requires A > A1(δ).
We note that A0(δ) is decreasing from+∞ to A0(eb), when δ increases from 0 to its upper
bound eb. In contrast, A1(δ) is increasing from A1(0) to A1(eb), keeping finite values. Since
A1(eb) > A0(eb) but A1(0) < A0(0), there exists δ ∈ (0, eb) such that A1(δ) < A0(δ) for all
δ < δ. In this case, the interval (A1(δ), A0(δ)) is non-empty.
Now, substituting (A.2) in (A.1), we can show that θ(x˜) < 0 is equivalent to:
[(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)2 Abτ1 − (1−m)(1+ b)τ1(1− α)− (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))(e+ δ)]2
> 4(1+ b)τ1(1− α)(a1 − a2τ2(1− α)) [(e+ δ)(1−m)− δ(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)A](A.3)
This inequality is satisfied if one takes A sufficiently close to A0(δ). Indeed, this ensures
that the right-hand side of inequality (A.3) is arbitrarily weak, while the left-hand side is
strictly positive.
Note that when m = 1, A0(δ) tends to 0. The first case applies, showing that there is a
unique steady state x0 > 0. However, by direct inspection of (22) with m = 1, x = 0 is not
a steady state. When δ = e = 0, we deduce that using (A.1), that there is one stationary
solution x0 > 0 if and only if A >
(1−m)(1+b)
(1−τ1−τ2)(1−α)b . Moreover, the steady state x = 0 is not
ruled out. This concludes the proof.
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B Proof of Proposition 2
The dynamics are driven by equation (21). We have ψ(+∞) = b(1−α)(1−τ1−τ2)
(1+b)(a1−a2τ2(1−α)) > 0 and
ψ(0) = 0. Moreover,
ψ′(x) = (1− α)A(1− τ1 − τ2)
Γ(x)2
[τ1(1− α)A(be− δ)x[1−m + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))Ax] (A.4)
+(1−m)(δ+ bτ1(1− α)Ax)[e+ δ+ (1+ b)τ1(1− α)Ax]] (A.5)
where Γ(x) ≡ [e+ δ+ (1 + b)τ1(1− α)Ax][1− m + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))Ax] corresponds to
the denominator of ψ(x). We deduce that ψ′(+∞) = 0 and
ψ′(0) = (1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)δA
(1−m)(e+ δ)
Therefore, ψ′(0) > 1 if A > A0(δ), while ψ′(0) < 1 if A < A0(δ). Using Proposition 1
and the continuity of ψ(x), the results follow.
When m = 1, we have:
ψ(xt) =
δ+ bτ1(1− α)Axt
(e+ δ) + (1+ b)τ1(1− α)Axt
(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)
a1 − a2τ2(1− α)
while when e = δ = 0,
ψ(xt) =
b
1+ b
(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)Axt
1−m + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))Axt
Using these two expressions of ψ(xt), we can easily deduce the stability properties when
m = 1 and e = δ = 0.
C Proof of Corollary 1
Assuming that a1 < a2(1− τ1)(1− α), we will show that under mild assumptions, case 2.b
of Proposition 3 applies, or equivalently x1 < xa < x2. To do that, we have to show that
θ(xa) < 0, where θ(x) is defined in (A.1). Substituting (26) in (A.1), we obtain after some
computations, that θ(xa) < 0 is equivalent to A > Aτ2 . Multiplicity of steady states requires
A < A0(δ). Therefore, we have to ensure the existence of a non-empty interval for A, i.e.
Aτ2 < A0(δ). This last inequality is equivalent to:
(1−m)(a2(1− τ1)(1− α)− a1)e(1− α)bτ1 + δ[τ1(1− α)(1−m)(b(a2τ2(1− α)− a1)
−a2(1− α)(1− τ1 − τ2)) + e(a2(1− τ1)(1− α)− a1)(a2τ2(1− α)− a1)]
+δ2(a2(1− τ1)(1− α)− a1)(a2τ2(1− α)− a1) > 0
Under Assumption 1 and a1 < a2(1− τ1)(1− α), we immediately see that there is an
upper bound δ˜ > 0 such that this inequality is satisfied if and only if 0 < δ < δ˜. The
corollary follows taking into account the conditions for the multiplicity of steady states.
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D Proof of Lemma 2
Using (29), we see that for all δ > be 1−τ2−2τ11−τ2+2bτ1 , H(x) < 0 for all x > 0.
For 0 6 δ < be 1−τ2−2τ11−τ2+2bτ1 , we compute the discriminant ∆(δ) of the polynomial of degree
2, H(x). We obtain:
∆(δ) = A2(1− α)2[be(1− τ2 − 2τ1)− δ(1− τ2 + 2bτ1)]2 − 4b(1+ b)τ21 (1− α)2 A2(e+ δ)δ
We deduce that ∆(0) > 0, while ∆(be 1−τ2−2τ11−τ2+2bτ1 ) < 0. Since ∆(δ) is a polynomial of
degree 2 in δ, there is a unique δH ∈ (0, be 1−τ2−2τ11−τ2+2bτ1 ), such that:
1. ∆(δ) < 0 for all δ ∈ (δH , be 1−τ2−2τ11−τ2+2bτ1 );
2. ∆(δ) > 0 for all δ ∈ (0, δH).
In case 1, since H′′(x) < 0, we deduce that H(x) < 0 for all x > 0. In case 2, H(x) = 0
has two roots, xH1 and x
H
2 , given by:
xH1 =
A(1− α)[be(1− τ2 − 2τ1)− δ(1− τ2 + 2bτ1)]−
√
∆(δ)
2b(1+ b)τ21 (1− α)2 A2
> 0 (A.6)
xH2 =
A(1− α)[be(1− τ2 − 2τ1)− δ(1− τ2 + 2bτ1)] +
√
∆(δ)
2b(1+ b)τ21 (1− α)2 A2
> xH1 (A.7)
Since H(0) 6 0, H(+∞) < 0 and H′′(x) < 0, we deduce that H(x) < 0 for all x < xH1 ,
H(x) > 0 for all xH1 < x < x
H
2 and H(x) < 0 for all x > x
H
2 . Note also that in the particular
case where δ = 0, H(0) = xH1 = 0.
Since ∂ψ(x)/δτ1 has the same sign than H(x), the lemma is proved.
E Proof of Proposition 4
To show Proposition 4.1 is obvious when δ > δH (see Lemma 2). Focusing now on the
configuration where 0 6 δ < δH , we will show that xH2 < x2. If this is satisfied, the result
may be deduced from Lemma 2.
To prove that xH2 < x2, we first note that using (A.7), x
H
2 < x
H , with:
xH ≡ be(1− τ2 − 2τ1)− δ(1− τ2 + 2bτ1)
b(1+ b)τ21 (1− α)A
Substituting xH in θ(x) (see equation (A.1)), θ(xH) < 0 is equivalent to:
A
(1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)
(1+ b)τ1
[be(1− τ2 − 2τ1)− δ(1− τ2 − (1− b)τ1)] > (1−m)(e+ δ)
+
be(1− τ2 − 2τ1)− δ(1− τ2 + 2bτ1)
b2(1+ b)τ31 (1− α)
[(a1 − a2τ2(1− α))(be(1− τ1 − τ2)
+δ(1− τ2 + bτ1)) + bτ21 (1−m)(1+ b)(1− α)]
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This inequality is satisfied for A sufficiently large. Since A0(δ) is decreasing in δ and
tends to +∞ when δ tends to 0, this condition is compatible with the multiplicity of steady
states if δ is sufficiently low. In this case, xH2 is lower than x2.
To prove Proposition 4.2, note that when δ = 0, xH1 = 0 and x
H
2 = x
H . In this case, we
have, of course, x1 < xH and ∂ψ(x1)/∂τ1 > 0 (see Lemma 2). By continuity, this result still
holds for δ sufficiently low.
F Proof of Proposition 5
Recall that gk may be defined by (see equation (25)):
gk = 1−m + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))Ax
Since gk is increasing in x and x is decreasing in τ1 at a stable steady state (see Proposition
4), we immediately deduce that gk is decreasing in τ1.
In contrast, the impact of τ2 on gk goes through two effects. Indeed, we have:
dgk
dτ2
=
∂gk
∂τ2
+
∂gk
∂x
∂x
∂τ2
(A.8)
with:
∂gk
∂τ2
= −a2(1− α)Ax < 0 (A.9)
∂gk
∂x
= [a1 − a2τ2(1− α)]A > 0 (A.10)
When x is decreasing in τ2, we obviously have dgk/dτ2 < 0. In contrast, when x is
increasing in τ2, we have two opposite effects. To show that dgk/dτ2 < 0, we first note that
using (A.1), we have:
∂x
∂τ2
= −∂θ(x)/∂τ2
θ′(x) (A.11)
with
∂θ(x)
∂τ2
= −(1+ b)τ1(1− α)2 A2a2x2 + [(1− α)2 A2bτ1 − a2(1− α)A(e+ δ)]x + δ(1− α)A
θ′(x) = 2(1+ b)τ1(1− α)A2(a1 − a2τ2(1− α))x + (1−m)(1+ b)τ1(1− α)A
+(a1 − a2τ2(1− α))A(e+ δ)− (1− τ1 − τ2)(1− α)2 A2bτ1
Note that since we focus on stable steady state, we have θ′(x) > 0 (see the proof of
Proposition 1). Using these expressions, dgk/dτ2 < 0 is equivalent to:
(1+ b)τ1(1− α)2 A3a2(a1 − a2τ2(1− α))x2 + [(1−m)(1+ b)τ1a2(1− α)2 A
+(1− α)2 A2bτ1(a1 − (1− α)a2(1− τ1))]Ax + (a1 − a2τ2(1− α))A2(1− α)δ > 0
Using θ(x) = 0 (see equation (A.1), we substitute x2 in this last inequality. After some
computations, we get:
(a1 − (1− α)a2τ2)(1− α)A2[(1− α)Abτ1 − a2(e+ δ)]x + A2(1− α)δ(a1 − a2τ2(1− α))
+(1− α)2 Aa2δ(1− τ1 − τ2)(A− A0(δ)) > 0
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This inequality is satisfied for A sufficiently close to A0(δ) and A large enough, such that
A > a2(e+δ)
(1−α)bτ1 . Note that this last condition is compatible with A < A0(δ) for δ sufficiently
low. This concludes the proof of the proposition.
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